The runtimes of certain floating-point instructions can vary up to two orders of magnitude with instruction operands, allowing attackers to break security and privacy guarantees of real systems (e.g., browsers). To prevent attacks due to such floating-point timing channels, we introduce CTFP, an efficient, machine-checked, and extensible system that transforms unsafe floating-point operations into safe, constant-time computations. CTFP relies on two observations. First, that it is possible to execute floating-point computations in constant-time by emulating them in software; and second, that most security critical applications do not require full IEEE-754 floating-point precision. We use these observations to: eliminate certain classes of dangerous values from ever reaching floatingpoint hardware; emulate floating-point operations on dangerous values when eliminating them would severely alter application semantics; and, leverage fast floating-point hardware when it is safe to do so. We implement the constant-time transformations with our own domain-specific language that produces LLVM bitcode. Since the transformations themselves equate to bit surgery on already complicated floating-point arithmetic, we use a satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solver to ensure that their behavior fits our specifications. Finally, we find that CTFP neither breaks real world applications nor incurs overwhelming overhead.
INTRODUCTION
path bifurcation allows hardware developers to make (simple) computations over common-case values orders of magnitude faster than (complex) computations designed to precisely account for special values.
Alas, every well-intentioned fast path eventually becomes an attacker's instrument. For example, Andrysco et al. show that attackers can exploit the timing differences between floating-point computations to exfiltrate the values of sensitive data, breaking Firefox's same-origin policy and the Fuzz database's differential privacy guarantees [4] . For Firefox, they implement Stone's pixel stealing attack [38] by measuring page rendering time. To break Fuzz [21] -a system specifically engineered to prevent covert timing attacks-they craft queries that return subnormal results for particular (private) values, and amplify the timing signal into one strong enough to break Fuzz's differential privacy guarantees.
In response to these attacks, system designers have tried to plug floating-point timing channels by using existing hardware features to force operations to take a fixed amount of time. For example, to address floating-point-based SVG filter attacks, Chrome browser developers set the "flush-to-zero" (FTZ) and "denormals-are-zero" (DAZ) CPU flags before calling the SVG library code [10, 23] . These flags set subnormal outputs and inputs to zero, respectively; since the timing attacks rely on subnormal values, enabling flags before executing the SVG filters prevents pixel stealing [12] . The Escort system [34] proposes a more general defense in which each FP operation is simultaneously executed on both a real input value and a dummy subnormal value via single instruction, multiple data (SIMD) instructions. Since SIMD instructions should execute in parallel and block until both results are computed, this tries to ensure that each FP operation takes exactly as long as the worstcase, subnormal running time.
Unfortunately, in relying on hardware alone to resolve timing variabilities, these proposals fall short in several ways. The FTZ + DAZ flags are incomplete-they focus exclusively on subnormals, but it turns out that other floating-point values can cause timing differences, too. For example, Kohlbrenner and Shacham show that certain operations speed up on non-subnormal values like zero and four [25] . In this paper, we confirm these timing measurements on additional CPUs and report three new classes of values that show timing variability for certain operations: NaNs, Infs, and negatives. Timing channels based on such values are hard to prevent with existing approaches, since existing approaches repurpose existing hardware-and there is a limit to how many kinds of pipes you can fix with a hammer.
Leveraging CPU features also demands a deep understanding of different-almost exclusively proprietary and closed-source-CPU details; if you're not Intel you're probably wrong. For example, Kohlbrenner and Shacham observe that certain CPUs execute some portion of the seemingly-parallel SIMD operations serially-not, like the name implies, in parallel [25] . Escort's design overlooks this completely unexpected detail, so the system remains vulnerable to timing attacks both on subnormals and on other values like zero.
In this paper, we introduce CTFP: an efficient, machine-checked, and extensible software-based approach to preventing FP timing channels. CTFP is based on two key insights. First, floating-point operations can be executed in constant-time by efficiently emulating them in software. Second, for the vast majority of security-critical applications, the full IEEE-754 precision is unnecessary. These two insights are distilled into program transformations that replace unsafe, elementary floating-point operations (e.g., multiplication and division) with new constant-time variants.
Since fully emulating IEEE floating-point arithmetic is impossibly slow, our constant-time operations are implemented as decorators for the existing hardware instructions. These decorators ensure that the hardware floating-point instructions are never called with inputs that may introduce time variability. For example, our decorators for the sqrt instruction eliminate, among other values (Section 2.1), subnormal and negative numbers from the input space to avoid FPU slow-and fast-paths, respectively. When encountering such inputs, the decorators instead emulate the operation using constant-time instructions. In all other cases, the decorators simply invoke the corresponding hardware instruction.
CTFP provides two classes of decorators, Full and Restrict, that trade-off precision and performance. Both classes of decorators eliminate subnormal input values from the input space by flushing them to zero, much like DAZ. The two decorators, however, differ in how they treat normal, but dangerous values that (may) produce subnormal results. Full decorators emulate operations on such values and only flush results that are indeed subnormal, much like FTZ. Restrict decorators, on the other hand, altogether eliminate dangerous values from the input space by flushing them (and thus their results) to zero-a precision hit that comes with a dramatic performance boost. Outside these ranges, both Full and Restrict preserve the IEEE-754 semantics.
Implementing constant-time floating-point instructions with correct semantics is hard. We must not only handle the complexity of floating-point arithmetic, but do so differently for each instructiondifferent floating-point operations are vulnerable to different classes of values-and in an extensible way-as new dangerous classes of values come to light, CTFP must be updated to account for them. To this end, CTFP is implemented as a domain-specific language (DSL) for specifying decorated, verified floating-point instructions. At its core, the DSL provides building blocks for (1) defining simple decorators (e.g., flush to zero if subnormal); (2) composing simple decorators into decorated instructions or more complex decorators (e.g., to handle multiple classes of values); and, (3) specifying the semantics of decorators and decorated instructions as pre-and post-conditions. The DSL compiler, in turn, generates constant-time LLVM bitcode for each decorated instruction, which we mechanically check for safety and precision issues using our verifier.
Machine-checked CTFP is only useful if it does not kill performance or ruin program semantics. We found it encouraging that FP-heavy programs transformed to use our CTFP constant-time instructions did not incur severe overheads-Full imposes an overhead of 3×-29×, while Restrict imposes an overhead of 1.7×-8.1×. For both, the impact on semantics is negligible. Both versions of CTFP pass all the tests from SPECfp, the floating-point performance testing suite from the SPEC 2006 benchmarks. Of the 913 unit tests from the Skia graphics library, Full passes all but 5 and Restrict fails only 7. More importantly, both Full and Restrict pass the entire suite of 654 rendering tests.
CONSTANT-TIME FLOATING-POINT
In this section, we give an overview of the classes of values that introduce floating-point (FP) timing channels and describe how CTFP addresses these timing channels. We first give a brief background on floating-point and how timing channels arise when FP operations exhibit different timing behaviors for different classes of values (Section 2.1). Then, we experimentally identify the different classes of values that lead to timing channels (Section 2.2). Finally, we sketch our approach to addressing the timing channels by decorating FP operations to execute in constant-time (Section 2.3).
Floating-Point and Timing Attacks
IEEE-754 is a standard for floating-point arithmetic that specifies all aspects of a floating-point number system from values (e.g., 32-bit single-precision, 64-bit double-precision, and 128-bit quadprecision), to rounding behavior and error conditions [6] . The standard was created to ensure hardware-software interoperability and, as a result of its popularity, essentially all modern CPUs include a specially designed floating-point unit (FPU) that accelerates floating-point operations.
In IEEE-754, the encoding of floating-point numbers consists of three different parts-a sign bit, a w-bit exponent, and a fixed-width significand. Under this encoding, the value of a normal floatingpoint number is specified by the following formula:
where bias = 2 w −1 − 1 and both the exponent and significant are treated as unsigned integers, the latter's bit-representation prefixed with a 1. The range for exponents for normal floating-point numbers is limited to [1, 2 w − 2]; exponents outside this range encode special values. For example, zeros (+0 and -0) are encoded by setting both the exponent and significand bits to 0s; infinities (+Inf and -Inf) are encoded by setting the exponent bits to 1s and the significand bits to 0s; and Not-a-Number values (NaNs) are encoded by setting the exponent bits to 1s and the significand to a value above zero. Lastly, subnormals are encoded by setting all the exponent bits to 0 and the significand to a value above zero. Subnormals (or denormals) are extremely small numbers, useful in retaining precision for computations on small numbers [6] ; they are computed according to:
The running time of floating-point operations can vastly depend on the values of the operands. Some FPU operations exhibit speedups on specific operands. Consider, for example, computing the square root of a negative number. This computation can be much faster than the the square root of an average positive numberthe FPU can simply short circuit the implementation of sqrt by checking the the siдn bit of the operand and return NaN if it is set. In fact, CPU designers would have to go out of their way to prevent such an "optimization. " In contrast, since few applications demand extremely high precision, most FPUs implement operations on subnormals in microcode, rendering these operations far slower than those on normal inputs. Measurable timing differences can be turned into covert timing channels. Attackers can leverage them to learn secret values, even when the rest of an application was engineered to keep instruction and memory access sequences independent of secret data [4] . For example, Andrysco et al. [4] show how subnormals can be exploited to break Firefox's same-origin guarantees by using them to implement Stone's pixel stealing attack [38] . Intuitively, the attack works by having the user render pages using using SVG filters that are specifically crafted so that when a pixel is black (resp. white), the filter results in many fast (resp. slow) 0 × subnormal = 0 (resp. 1 × subnormal = subnormal) operations. An attacker observing the timing differences can reconstruct the pixels and therefore the contents of the web-page, completely circumventing the browser's same-origin policy.
Classes of Potentially Dangerous Values
For performance, CTFP relies on the FPU to handle the bulk of the work of floating-point computations-but, since the latency of different computations may vary with arguments, CTFP must only directly use the FPU to execute floating-point operations on safe classes of values. Identifying all safe values is prohibitively expensive. So, beyond designing CTFP to be easily extensible, we follow in the lines of previous work on constant-time FP [4, 25, 34] and seek to identify classes of potentially dangerous values.
To identify unsafe classes of values, we measure the running time of operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and square root) with different inputs. Figure 2 presents the results of our measurements for different x86 CPUs. (In Section 5.1, we describe our measurement approach in detail.) We conservatively consider classes of values to be unsafe if they are unsafe on any CPU-this ensures that CTFP-transformed x86 is portable and can be safely used across CPUs.
As shown in Figure 1 , our measurements establish several classes of unsafe values: subnormal numbers, negative numbers, powersof-two, powers-of-four, and special values-zeros, Infs, and NaNs. While many of these were established by Andrysco et al. [4] and, more recently, Kohlbrenner and Shacham [25] , our measurements confirm their observations on different CPUs and identify new classes of unsafe values-negative numbers, NaNs, and Infs. In addition, we modify Kohlbrenner and Shacham's tests to distinguish powers-of-twos from powers-of-four and find the two classes to exhibit different timing behavior. Below we describe these different classes in more detail.
Subnormals
. Subnormal values induce an order-of-magnitude slowdown on most CPUs for most operations. They differ from other classes of values in not only being unsafe as inputs to FP operations, but also as outputs: operations that produce subnormal resultseven if operating on non-subnormals-are extremely slow.
Negative Values. Negative values are unsafe as operands to sqrt. Taking the square root of a negative exhibits a speed-up on some CPUs, since the operation amounts to checking a single bit before returning NaN.
Powers-of-Two. Powers-of-two are floating-point values that have a zero significand (see Section 2.1). Division with a power-of-two value as the divisor exhibits a speed-up on several CPUs for both single-and double-precision. In contrast to other classes of values, dividing by a power of two is equivalent to performing an addition on the dividend's exponent, a cheap and fast operation.
Powers-of-Four. Powers-of-four are floating-point values where the significand is zero and the exponent is even (see Section 2.1). While powers-of-four values exhibit the same behavior as powers-of-two values for division, the two classes differ for square root operations. Specifically, powers-of-four exhibit a speed-up on several CPUs for sqrt. This is not surprising since taking the square root of a power-of-four is equivalent to dividing its exponent by two, i.e., a simple bit-shift.
Special Values. Special values include floating-point values of zero, Inf, NaN, and their negative counterparts. Special values show a speed-up for division and square root on many CPUs. This is not surprising since division and square root on these values have fixed results: zero divided by anything (except zero or NaN) is zero, the square root of NaN is NaN, etc.
Eliminating Timing Attacks with CTFP
To address attacks that leverage floating-point timing channels, we eliminate timing difference in FP computations by emulating elementary operations (addition, multiplication, etc.) on unsafe values in software, only leveraging the FPU, internally, to perform safe constant-time computations. Our constant-time emulation is not perfect, though. We relax some of the floating-point semantics in return for performance when emulating operations on deadly and dangerous values.
An argument to a particular FP operation is deadly if it always triggers a slow-or fast-path in the FPU (on some processor). For example, subnormal values are deadly values for all FP operations, while negative numbers are only deadly as operands to sqrt. An argument to a particular FP operation is dangerous if it can ever
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Intel Core i7-7700 (Kaby Lake) produce a subnormal output-and therefore trigger a slow-path in the FPU. For example, very small normal values are dangerous as operands to a FP multiplication (if their result is subnormal). A faithful, but unacceptably slow IEEE-754 implementation would emulate operations on all values (including deadly and dangerous values). A fast, but unacceptably imprecise implementation would eliminate all deadly and dangerous values from the input space. CTFP presents two classes of decorated floating-point instructions that are in the sweet-spot: they are efficient while preserving floating-point semantics relevant to many real-world applications. Our decorators emulate operations on both dangerous and nonsubnormal deadly values in software, but perform operations on safe values directly (by calling normal floating-point operations like fadd and fmul). Full, the more precise version of CTFP, preserves the (almost) full FTZ + DAZ floating-point range; Restrict, the less precise version, alters the floating-point range range more significantly but is also significantly faster. We implement CTFP as a DSL that makes it easy to update the Restrict and Full decorators to account for newly discovered unsafe values.
Eliminating Subnormals. CTFP decorates (i.e., wraps) floatingpoint hardware instructions to eliminate subnormals as both inputs to and outputs from FP operations. Both our Full and Restrict decorators eliminate subnormal operands by flushing them to zero and then performing the intended operation on zero(s). 1 The two classes of decorators differ in how they handle dangerous values.
To ensure that no FP operation produces subnormals, Full emulates operations on dangerous input values-the values that may produce subnormals. This is non-trivial, since operations on dangerous values do not necessarily produce subnormals. Full thus checks if the result of the operation would be subnormal, without actually performing the potentially unsafe operation. If the result is guaranteed to be normal, Full performs the floating-point operation on the dangerous value(s); otherwise, it produces zero-of course ensuring that the entire computation runs in constant-time.
Our range-restricted decorators, Restrict, do not emulate operations on dangerous values. Instead, Restrict eliminates dangerous input values altogether by flushing them to a zero or infinity (depending on the operation). Compared to Full, this approach is dramatically faster (see Section 5) . Of course, it also significantly alters the semantics of several FP operations-for example, our Restrict decorators for division essentially eliminate half the input space. In practice, though, this seems to not damage the behavior of many applications (see Section 5).
Emulating Operations on Deadly Values. Both classes of decorators emulate operations on other deadly input values by specialcasing each class of values-powers-of-twos, zeros, NaNs, etc. At a high-level, a CTFP decorated instruction (1) replaces each deadly operand with a dummy, safe value; (2) performs the operation on the dummy value(s); and, (3) returns the actual result, as if were computed on the deadly value(s). For example, consider executingand overwrites the result with infinity-all in constant-time. In Section 3, we describe the implementation of the Full and Restrict decorated instructions in detail.
Correct and Extensible Decorators. Decorating floating-point instructions is error-prone: decorators have to account for all the intricacies of floating-point arithmetic. Moreover, decorated instructions must be extensible-in a month or a year or five years, someone may discover a whole new class of unsafe floating-point values. To account for these issues we implement CTFP as a DSL, so developers can specify new decorated instructions using generic high-level building blocks. Then, they can ensure that their new instructions are correct using our verifier, and compile them into optimized LLVM bitcode. Section 3 and Section 4 respectively describe the DSL and verifier in detail.
Threat Model. We assume an attacker capable of running floatingpoint computations (e.g., as SVG filters [38] ) on sensitive data in an attempt to leak the data. These computations, however, are restricted to our decorated constant-time floating-point operations and cannot use the hardware instructions directly. To this end, CTFP provides a program transformation that rewrites existing operations with our constant-time variants (see Section 3.4). We consider attacks that abuse other CPU instructions (e.g., branching) outside the scope of this work-instructions such as conditional branches can trivially introduce time-variability, however, and must be addressed in practice. We believe techniques that address these broader concerns (e.g., [8, 28, 33] ) are complimentary to CTFP.
THE CTFP DSL
CTFP ensures that floating-point operations execute in constanttime using carefully crafted bitmasking operations. In this section, we describe how to create the bitmasking operations using the CTFP domain specific language (embedded in Haskell). Then, we show how CTFP goes from DSL implementations of Restrict and Full to LLVM bitcode.
At its core, CTFP consists of basic floating-point operations op, and decorators tx. Each op represents-and is compiled to-a lowlevel LLVM function. Each decorator takes as input an operation and returns a new operation that "wraps" or "transforms" the input operation; we can use the decorators to transform unsafe operations into their safe counterparts. Both decorators and operations are represented in the DSL "meta-language," Haskell. We develop CTFP by composing multiple decorators tx 1 , tx 2 , . . . , each of which accounts for a subset of unsafe inputs. Inspired by Python [36] , we write tx @ op for the result of applying the decorator tx to the operation op, and tx 1 @ . . . @ tx n @ op for the result of composing the decorators tx 1 , . . . , tx n . Below, we describe the building blocks of our DSL and the four decorator "strategies" that we use to implement the Restrict and Full operations.
Primitives. Our DSL has the following primitives that correspond to the machine operations that test and manipulate floating-point values.
▶ Floating-point and integer literals. ▶ Floating-point arithmetic functions, including addition (fadd), subtraction (fsub), multiplication (fmul), division (fdiv), and square-root (fsqrt). ▶ Bitwise functions, including and, or, xor, and not.
▶ Comparison functions, including ordered equality (oeq), ordered less than (olt), ordered greater than (ogt), unordered less than or equal to (ule), unordered greater than or equal to (uge), unordered-is-negative check (isUneg), and a NaN check (isNaN). ▶ Sign functions, including abs-which computes the absolute value of a floating-point value-and copySign-which creates a value with a given magnitude and sign.
Conditionals. Since conditional branching can introduce timing variabilities, our DSL does not provide general conditional branching primitives [1] . Instead, we provide a function ite that can be used to select between two values: ite b x y evaluates to x if b is true and y otherwise. Internally, ite is implemented using constant-time bitvector operations:
ite b e1 e2 = (b`and`e1)`or`(not b`and`e2)
We ensure that the condition variable (b) is always true (i.e., all 1s) or false (i.e., all 0s). In the former (resp. latter) case, ite returns e1 (resp. e2).
Calls. Recall that each decorator tx is a meta-function that takes as input an op function and returns a new function. The new, decorated function may call op-or any other primitive function-via the DSL primitive call.
Generic Blinding Decorator. We express all CTFP decorators using the generic blinding decorator shown below:
txBlind isUnsafe blind fix op = λvs -> let unsafe = isUnsafe vs safeVs = ite unsafe (blind vs) vs res = call op safeVs fixedRes = ite unsafe (fix vs res) res in fixedRes This decorator takes as input four functions: 2 ▶ isUnsafe: tests if any input value is unsafe, ▶ blind: replaces the unsafe inputs with safe values that can be used as inputs to op, ▶ fix: produces a correct output given the (potentially) unsafe inputs and the result of the operation, and ▶ op: the operation to be decorated. Given these input functions, the decorator returns a new "wrapped" operation.
Core CTFP Decorators
We use the binding decorator txBlind to implement the four highlevel decorators for all Full and Restrict decorated instructions.
Dummy Value Decorator. For several floating-point operations, emulating the computation on certain unsafe values amounts to returning a constant value. For example, the square-root of NaN or a negative number-both unsafe-is NaN. To this end, our DSL provides the dummy value decorator:
This decorator addresses the timing variability of an operation op (without altering its semantics) by computing on dummy safeIninstead of deadly or dangerous badIn-and returning badOut, the value that would be returned if the unsafe computation were actually performed. The decorator txDummies generalizes txDummy to blind multiple deadly inputs at once; this allows our DSL to generate more efficient code than would be possible by repeatedly applying txDummy.
Underflow and Overflow Decorators. Restrict and Full manipulate the range of floating-point numbers to eliminate subnormal numbers from the input and output space. CTFP accomplishes this by implementing underflow and overflow in software:
Decorator txUnderflow takes as input a threshold value lim and returns a decorator that replaces all inputs under the threshold with positive or negative zero. txOverflow replaces all inputs over the threshold with the special value Inf. Both decorators return the result of op on the zero or infinity.
Predict Decorator. Since computations that produce subnormal outputs exhibit time variability, CTFP must predict these outputs without performing the dangerous operation:
This decorator performs a safe, constant-time computation on modified inputs in order to predict whether the output (on the original values) is deadly or not. It takes three inputs:
▶ a function shift that, given the input v returns a shifted value shift v in lieu of the underlying operation, ▶ a threshold lim that is an upper bound on the magnitude of deadly outputs for the underlying operation, ▶ and a safe input safeIn that should be used if the output is indeed deadly. Given these inputs, we use txBlind to return a decorated operation that executes on safeIn if the shifted (output) value falls within the (shifted) deadly region denoted by lim, and executes unchanged otherwise.
Restrict Decorated Instructions
In this section, we show how to use our DSL to implement the constant-time Restrict floating-point operations. Restrict exploits the fact that there is a range of normal floating-point values that are guaranteed to also produce safe, normal outputs for a given floating-point operation. Restrict uses the dummy, underflow, and overflow decorators to flush values outside of this safe range to zero and infinity. Each floating-point operation has its own safe input range. For example, for multiplication, an input range [0.1, 10.0] is sufficient to prevent subnormal outputs since multiplying the smallest possibles value of 0.1 with itself yields 0.01 (a value far from any subnormal numbers). To minimize the impact on floating-point precision, however, we want the largest safe input range possible; Figure 3 summarizes the cutoffs that CTFP uses for the different operations.
Addition, Subtraction, and Multiplication. To transform addition, we restrict the input range so that any values below addMin (9.86e-32) are flushed to zero. The following code demonstrates the Restrict version of addition:
Subtraction is nearly identical to addition, except that we change the base operation to fsub. For multiplication, we underflow values smaller than mulMin (1.08e-19).
Division. A safe division operator must account for three classes of deadly values. First, out-of-range values like very large divisors or small dividends can lead to subnormal outputs. Second, special values like NaN or Inf or Zero can trigger special cases that return early (and thus take less time than a "typical" division). Third, some implementations of division enjoy a small but exploitable speedup [25] when the divisor is a power-of-two. We address these three classes of values with three decorators (txRange, txSpecial, and divPowers2), and compose them to implement the Restrict division shown in Figure 4 . First, the txRange decorator underflows dividends smaller than divMin (1.08e-19) to zero, and overflows divisors larger than divMax (9.22e+18) to infinity to ensure that the outputs are not subnormal. We chose these cutoffs to roughly balance the number of floating-point values below the lower cutoff and above the upper cutoff. 3 Once we eliminate the out-of-range values, we call the safeDiv function, a decorated version of division that is safe whenever the inputs and outputs are normal. We implement safeDiv by wrapping the base operation fdiv with two decorators that respectively account for special values and powers-of-two. ▶ The txSpecial decorator emulates division on special inputs-NaNs, Infs and Zeros-using the txDummies decorator to perform constant-time division on a Dummy (1.5), normal value. ▶ divPowers2 handles powers-of-two divisors. This decorator exploits the insight that a power-of-two divisor can be split into two parts d = s × e where the significand s lies in the range [1, 2) and the exponent e is exactly a power of two. To this end, our decorator emulates the division computation by performing division by parts, i.e., in two steps n/d = (n/e)/s where dividing by e is always "fast" and dividing by s is always "slow". When splitting division into parts, we use txDummy to account for the special degenerate case where s = 1.0. Also, since the intermediate result of n/e may itself underflow or overflow to Zero or Inf we again use txDummies to handle these safely-recall that Zero and Inf are special values for division.
Square Root. The Restrict implementation of square root must account for four classes of deadly values. First, as with other operations, square root is unsafe when the input is subnormal. Second, as with division, square root exposes a timing variability due to the special values Zero, Inf and NaN. Third, negative input values are deadly for square root. Finally, some implementations of square root are faster on powers-of-four inputs. We account for these cases by composing a sequence of transforms. We use the txUnderflow decorator to eliminate subnormal inputs (values below fltMin) and flush them to zero. As with division, we use txDummy to emulate the operation on special values NaN, Inf and Zero (in the last case, we return v to preserve the sign). The sqrtNeg decorator-implemented using txBlind-emulates square root on negative input values by performing the computation on a dummy value and returning NaN.
Finally, sqrtPowers4 emulates square root on powers-of-four using txBlind. This decorator checks if the value is a power-offour 4 and, if so, blinds the input by adding a single bit to it (i.e., sqrtPowers4 computes sqrt ( input + ULP ), where ULP is the unit of least precision). It fixes the result by removing (via a bit-mask) the at-most single incorrect bit from the output.
Full Decorated Instructions
Since this is exactly the timing-variable computation that we wish to avoid, though, our decorated operations rely on the txPredict decorator to perform this computation on scaled but timing-safe values, in order to determine whether they are safe.
Addition, Subtraction, and Multiplication. Figure 5 shows the Full version of addition. To decorate addition, we first apply the underflow decorators to eliminate subnormal inputs. Next, we use the predictAdd decorator to emulate addition, accounting for inputs that may result in subnormal outputs. Internally the predictAdd decorator multiplies both inputs with a constant C (addC in the figure) so that C · a + C · b is normal for all possible inputs a and b. It then tests the result against C · M (addLim in the figure), i.e., it checks if |C · a + C · b| ≥ C · M, to determine if the output of the computation is subnormal. If the output is subnormal, the decorator replaces the inputs with Zeros; otherwise it leaves the inputs intact. It then performs the floating-point addition on the safe inputs. Subtraction is implemented the same, except the base operation fadd is replaced by subtraction fsub.
For the decorated multiplication we use the predictMul decorator to emulate multiplication after subnormal inputs are eliminated. This decorator performs a scaled multiplication to determine if a × b is subnormal, and if so, sets the inputs to Zero. Unlike the predictAdd decorator, predictMul uses a single multiplication (by mulC) to scale the operation outside of the subnormal range, after which the result is compared against the threshold mulLim to determine if the output is subnormal.
Division. As with the previous operations, we use txUnderflow decorators to eliminate subnormal inputs and a predict decorator, predictDiv, to remove normal inputs that produce a subnormal output. The predict decorator for division is more complex, though, since extreme operands may (1) require intermediate computation on values larger than FLT_MAX or (2) overflow intermediate values 4 The binary representation of a power-of-four has all zeros in the significand and an odd exponent-the odd exponent translates to a power-of-four due to the exponent bias. Thus, to determine if the input is a power-of-four, the blinding condition extracts the significand bits of the input and the last bit of the exponent and compares the result to verify all significand bits are zero and the exponent ends in a one bit. to infinity. For the first issue, consider a/b when a is 1.18e-38 and b is 3.4e38. The result of the shifted division using divC (8.5e37) will produce the subnormal 2.9e-39. Unfortunately, we cannot address this by simply increasing divC to the necessary value of 3.4e38, since this number exceeds the maximum size of single-precision floats. For the second issue, consider when a is 5e31 and b is 2e-07. When divByParts splits b into 1.2e-7 and 1.68 such that the first division results in 4e38, a value that incorrectly overflows to infinity. Consequently, we must account for the possibility of the first division-the division by the exponent-overflowing without giving up on precision. For both cases-when the trial division is subnormal or when the intermediate value in divByParts overflows-we use the decorator extremeDiv to shift the value of b up or down to avoid subnormals and overflow.
Square Root. The Full square root operator is identical to the Restrict one shown in Section 3.2 since the square-root of a normal number is guaranteed to be normal.
Implementation
CTFP generates LLVM code from our DSL by generating a new LLVM function for each decorated term, yielding constant-time equivalents for each floating-point operation. Given an DSL term ctOp = tx 1 @ . . . @ tx n @ op CTFP generates a sequence of functions f 1 . . . f n+1 where each f n+1 is just op and each f i is the result of applying the decorator tx i to f i+1 . We use Clang version 6.0.0 on Linux to generate constant-time machine code targeting Skylake processors (-march = skylake). We manually verify this machine code is free of unsafe instructions (e.g., conditional branches).
Vectorized CTFP Transformations. For each instruction, our tool supports floats and doubles as either scalars or vectors of sizes 2, 4, 8, or 16. Supporting vectorized CTFP transformations is crucial for performance. Without vector support, the CTFP transformations must run before the vectorization passes of LLVM, and the CTFP code's complexity prevents the future vectorization passes from succeeding. By supplying vector versions of the CTFP transformation, the pass is able to run after vectorization and take full advantage of the resulting SIMD instructions.
Source Code. The full source code for CTFP is publicly available at http://ctfp.programming.systems. The repository includes the Haskell DSL for generating Restrict and Full floating-point operations, the LLVM plugin for applying CTFP as a optimization pass in Clang, and our verifier.
VERIFYING CTFP WITH SMT
As demonstrated by the decorators in Section 3, floating-point computations have various subtle corner cases, and it is quite easy to get transformations wrong. To address this issue, we implemented LLVC, a verifier for the LLVM fragment used by CTFP. LLVC converts LLVM programs and specifications into logical formulas called verification conditions (VCs) whose validity (1) can be automatically checked by SMT solvers, and (2) implies that the LLVM program adheres to the given specification. Next, we describe LLVC and how we use it to verify that CTFP's decorated operations indeed eliminate inputs and outputs that could lead to timing variability and produce results that are equivalent to the IEEE-754 behaviors for the respective Restrict-or Full-value ranges. During development, we found and fixed six bugs using verification, from tricky cases involving special values to semantic differences caused under certain rounding modes.
SMT Solvers. SMT solvers are automatic decision procedures that can determine whether a formula is satisfiable, i.e., whether a formula evaluates to true for some assignment of values to the variables in the formula. The formula is unsatisfiable if no such assignment exists. Dually, we say a formula is valid if the formula evaluates to true for all assignments of values to the variables. Note that a formula is valid if its negation is unsatisfiable. For example, when queried with formula a ∨ b, an SMT solver will return a satisfying assignment a = true, b = false that makes the formula evaluate to true. When queried with a ∧ ¬a, the SMT solver will return unsat, indicating that no satisfying assignment exists. In other words, the negation of the above, namely ¬(a ∨ ¬a) is valid.
Reasoning about Floating-Point Arithmetic with SMT. Users can express relatively high-level concepts about program structures as SMT formulas by using functions and predicates that belong to theories. Theories include integers, arrays, and bit-vectors. We encode the semantics of CTFP transformations using the theories of bit-vectors and floating-point arithmetic [9] formalized in SMT-LIB [7] , an initiative for standardizing theories and input languages across different solver implementations. The floating-point theory is a formalization based on the IEEE-754 standard, and includes basic arithmetic operations, sqrt, the five different rounding modes, and special values. We use commit 95963f7 of Z3 [16] as our SMT solver because it is one of the few solvers that currently support the floating-point theory.
Specification
Function Contracts. In LLVC, we model all operations i.e., LLVM primitives like comparisons, bitwise operations, select and arithmetic, and of course, call-as function calls. In LLVC, users can specify desired properties as Floyd-Hoare style function contracts comprising a precondition that callers must establish on the function's inputs, and a postcondition that the function will guarantee about the function's output [22] . Next, we show how we can use contracts to specify the two key properties that CTFP ensures ▶ Safety: The decorators must prevent any unsafe, timingsensitive values from being passed as inputs to or returned as outputs from floating-point instructions, and ▶ Equivalence: The decorators must preserve floating-point semantics for safe values so that the end-to-end application behavior is unchanged.
Safety Contracts. The safety contracts are the same regardless of Restrict or Full mode. For each operator we require that their inputs be safe, i.e., not any of the special timing-sensitive values, and that they do not produce timing sensitive values as output. Dually, for each operator we ensure that the output is exactly the result of applying the respective operator to the two inputs. For example, for the fadd operation, we specify the contract shown in Section 6. The precondition fadd32_requires is a predicate over the two inputs a and b that says that the fadd must be called with inputs that are normal, and which produce normal outputs. The postcondition fadd32_ensures is a predicate over the two inputs and the output ret which says that the operator returns exactly the result of the floating-point addition of its two inputs.
Equivalence Contracts for Restrict. We specify the equivalence property for an operator op by writing contract for the toplevel decorated function corresponding to op. This contract specifies a precondition that the inputs of the function can be called with any input because the decorated functions must properly account for all possible floating-point input values. However, the contract specifies that the output value is only correct for non-dangerous inputs that fall outside the threshold specific to the operator.
For example, for fadd we specify the contract for the top-level function @restrictAdd1 from Figure 7 that says that (1) the inputs must satisfy the precondition true and (2) the function return value (ret) satisfies the postcondition: This postcondition ensures that outputs preserve floating-point semantics if the inputs are not dangerous, i.e., the inputs are larger than addMin; otherwise, the function returns the result performing fadd on underflowed (to zero) inputs. We precisely define the semantics of underflowing as the SMT predicate: The exact threshold-here, addMin-depends on the type of the operation op as laid out in Figure 3 .
Equivalence Contracts for Full. As before, we specify the equivalence contract for Full as a contract for the top-level operator, where the precondition is true. However, this time, the contract specifies that the output value is correct for all non-deadly inputs and underflows otherwise: Optimality. In addition to checking for safety and equivalence, we use the SMT solver to determine whether our choice of thresholds used in the Restrict decorators is optimal, i.e., the threshold C chosen for op is as small as possible. 5 To check optimality, we change the code and conditions to use the next smaller floatingpoint value for C and query the SMT solver to prove that they admit a deadly computation. For example, for Restrict addition, we check that the threshold addMin is optimal by checking that the SMT solver finds a counterexample that violates the safety contracts when we change addMin to addMin − ULP.
Verification
Next, we describe how LLVC converts LLVM programs and contract specifications into VCs whose validity formally guarantees that the generated code enjoys the safety and equivalence properties, i.e., proves the constant-time and correctness properties for all inputs. If the VC is invalid, i.e., its negation is satisfiable, the solver returns a counterexample: a concrete set of floating-point inputs on which some property is violated, which we found invaluable in hunting down tricky bugs in our CTFP implementation.
Contracts for LLVM Primitives. Recall that in LLVC, the semantics of all LLVM primitives are modeled as contracts. This modeling is eased by the fact that many floating-point LLVM instructions have a corresponding function or predicate in the SMT-LIB floatingpoint theory. For example, the LLVM instruction fadd float %1 , %2 is modeled by the contract in Figure 6 . The postcondition describes the output of the operation and is modeled as a single SMT operation, fp . add. For some instructions, we have to take care to precisely model the semantics by combining other SMT-LIB predicates. For example, the LLVM not-equals comparison fcmp une float %a , % b returns true if any of the arguments of the comparison are NaN. We model these by turning the original comparison a ⋄b into a ⋄b ∨ isNaN(a) ∨ isNaN(b) , via the following postcondition:
Finding bugs in CTFP. The verification tool found, and helped us fix, several subtle errors in our design of the Restrict and Full operations:
▶ An early version of Full missed the fact that ∞ − ∞ = NaN; consequently, it used an ordered (instead of an unordered comparison), which led to large values underflowing to zero. ▶ An early version of Full was wrong when rounding towards zero. In this rounding-mode there is no overflow to ∞, which breaks addition (as described in Section 3.3). ▶ The trial comparison in Full multiplication was off by 1 ULP. ▶ Our optimality check allowed us to improve the cutoff thresholds for the Restrict addition. In earlier versions, we found that the threshold was too conservative in that it unnecessarily rounded values down. ▶ Our safety check discovered that an earlier version of the Restrict division was using a threshold that was too aggressive: it was possible to generate inputs that yielded subnormal output values, thereby violating CTFP's constant-time guarantees. ▶ Finally, the computation in predictDiv produced subnormal intermediate values. As a result, we developed the extremeDiv decorator to handle specific cases of large and small values.
In addition to the fixed issues, the verification tool discovered the limitation that the Full multiplication and division are not exact when the result is FLT_MIN or DBL_MIN. We remark that every one of these issues involved tricky floatingpoint semantics and special values. This made them hard to detect manually ahead of time-LLVC's SMT-based verification proved invaluable for implementing CTFP.
Verifying Restrict and Full Transformations. While the SMT solver was able to find the above bugs in a few seconds, proving the safety and equivalence took much longer. Figure 8 lists the operations and the time taken for Z3 to verify each one. As expected, verifying Restrict transformations is significantly faster than their Full counterparts. The verification times also show that division is, by far, the most complex operation to verify; this is not surprisingdivision consists of many decorators and the underlying operation itself is complex to reason about. To improve performance, we manually introduce binary clauses of the form ( or x ( not x ) ) and ask Z3 to split them into subgoals. We find this effective when we use it on the values of the initial conditions of some of the decorators. Intuitively, this is because most of our decorators check for some bad value at the start of the function. Depending on the outcome of that check, the possible register values are often very different (e.g., a certain register may always be zero if the check succeeds), so treating the two outcomes as separate subgoals can be useful-the solver does not have to discover the variable to split on by itself. Figure 8 also highlights the number of assumptions we require for verification to complete-without them, the solver does not finish within a reasonable time limit. The assumptions that we rely on largely help Z3 reason about scaled values (e.g., when determining whether the output of an operation could be subnormal). Our Restrict decorators require a single assumption: for the Restrict division we assume the outcome of divByParts is correct for the given range. Full is slightly more demanding in requiring eight assumptions. Two of the Full division assumptions are directly analogous to our Restrict assumption, one for each divByParts performed. In addition, one of the divByParts decorators requires an assumption that the values passed to the following decorator fall into a specified range. The preconditions are slightly different in both applications of the decorator, so the reasoning about the possible values is different. Two assumptions help Z3 reason about the extremeDiv decorator; the decorator avoids extreme output values by scaling the inputs, our assumptions say that the scaled computations do not change the result. The remaining assumptions state that our subnormal predition dectorators are accurate. For example, we assume that predictMul accurately predicts whether the result is subnormal or not (except when the result is FLT_MIN/DBL_MIN). We note that to our 64-bit division remains unverified-verifying 64-bit divisions in a reasonable amount of time requires many more assumptions, defeating the purpose of using verification.
EVALUATION
We evaluate CTFP on three fronts-security, correctness, and performance-by answering the following questions: does the CTFPdecorated code ▶ (Section 5.1) execute in constant-time? ▶ (Section 5.2) change the input-output ranges as specified? ▶ (Section 5.3) break the behavior of applications? ▶ (Section 5.4) perform with acceptable overheads? We find that CTFP indeed eliminates exploitable timing vulnerabilities; i.e., the decorated floating-point operations execute in constant-time over the range of inputs that we tested. Furthermore, both the Full and Restrict operations do not break Skia's rendering tests or the SPECfp benchmark suite. In our experiments, Restrict CTFP adds an overhead of 1.7-8.0x, while Full CTFP adds an overhead of 3.5x-29x. 6 We compiled all benchmarks with Clang 6.0.0 and ran them on a machine with an Intel Core i7-7700 (Kaby Lake) CPU.
CTFP Executes In Constant Time
We time the CTFP floating-point operations with different inputs to determine if they actually exhibit any exploitable timing variability.
Inputs and Operations. We choose normal input values and a selection of special values from the following categories: subnormal, zero, one, powers-of-two, powers-of-four, infinity, and NaN. We test all combinations of these inputs on all original floatingpoint operations and their Restrict and Full versions. We use this method because the input space-all combinations of all floatingpoint numbers-is too large to test exhaustively. Similarly, picking random values to test would rarely yield known problematic inputs since, for example, single-precision floating-point numbers have 2 32 possible values and only 2 23 of those are subnormals.
Testing Method. We use the rdtsc instruction to measure the running time of executing an operation 32 times. To minimize the effects of out-of-order execution and pipelining, we introduce an artificial data dependency by reassigning the input: in = m_xor_d ( m_xor_d ( out , res ) , in ). 7 We repeat this process a million times to overcome timing inconsistencies like context switches or hyper-threading and average the median 50% of measurements.
Results. Figure 2 summarizes the results of running the original single-precision floating-point operations on different CPUs. All CPUs exhibit timing differences in multiple cases. An operation on a value category is marked unsafe if its runtime differs from that on normal values. Because timing differences can be very small, we consider any consistent performance difference unsafe. In contrast, for the CTFP versions of the floating-point operations, we found that the execution time for all value categories on each instruction (e.g., addition for all values) varies by less than 1%, which falls well below the threshold of a single clock cycle. In other words, our results show that CTFP eliminates any exploitable timing variability from these FP instructions.
CTFP Changes Ranges as Specified
Both the Restrict and Full decorations change the semantics of floating-point operations: the former only guarantees IEEE-754 semantics for input values in the safe range, and the latter, for all computations that do not consume or produce deadly values. Next, we check that the decorated code returns the same output as the original code in cases where we intend to preserve semantics. Similarly, we test that the decorated code changes semantics correctly when intended, e.g., that subnormal values are indeed replaced by zeroes. To validate the known timing channels, we test each operation using every combination inputs from each value class. In order to find other bugs, we enumerate one million pairs of random inputs and verify that each operation produces the correct result and every primitive operation never observes a deadly value on input or output.
Full Correctness. We formally verify that our decorated floatingpoint operations preserve the semantics of the underlying operation when neither its inputs nor its output are subnormal (Section 4). As an additional sanity check, we run micro-benchmarks to confirm that CTFP instructions exactly match the IEEE-754 specification with flush-to-zero and denormals-are-zero flags enabled, on various combinations of inputs. Specifically, we test IEEE-75 compliance for all operations over all special values in addition to one million randomly generated pairs of inputs.
Restrict Correctness. The Restrict decorated operations directly evaluate the corresponding machine operations on values that fall within the safe range, and hence, trivially produce equivalent results. Thus, we just test that CTFP zeroes out values that fall outside of the safe range (for a given operation).
CTFP Preserves Application Behavior
CTFP changes the semantics of floating-point operations. Hence, we evaluate whether these changes are benign or if they can adversely affect real applications. To this end, we evaluate CTFP on the SPEC benchmarks and the Skia 2D graphics engine. Evaluating SPEC and Skia did not require changing their code (and optionally included changing only a few lines of their tests). We just linked against a version of the MUSL -libc math library, which we created using an LLVM pass to replace normal floating-point operations with CTFP operations. SPEC Benchmarks. Both the Restrict and Full operations pass all C and C++ tests from the SPECfp benchmark suite. The SPEC tests demonstrate that restricting the range of floating-point numbers still leaves enough power to complete many scientific computing tasks: physics calculations, molecular dynamics, linear programming, ray tracing, fluid dynamics, and speech recognition.
Skia Graphics Library. We test whether CTFP works on the Skia library, since this library is widely used (e.g., in Google Chrome, Chrome OS, Chromium OS, Firefox, Android, Firefox OS, and Sublime Text 3) and has been the target of a floating-point timing attack [25] . After compiling Skia with both versions of CTFP, we test Skia's default configuration of 1565 tests (excluding those for the GPU). These tests comprise 913 unit tests and 654 render tests which check the end-to-end functionality of everything from fonts to drawing primitives. When we compiled Skia with the -ffast-math flag, the test suite would not complete: it kept failing assertions and looping infinitely. This indicates that Skia is very sensitive to changes in floating-point semantics, which makes it a particularly useful stress test for CTFP.
Full Skia Tests. Comparing the CTFP results to those of the original reference build, we found that Full-Skia passes the same set of rendering tests, but fails on five floating-point-specific unit tests. Three of the unit tests explicitly use subnormal values to test low level vector and matrix operations. Another unit fails in the function SkFloatToHalf due to a multiplication by a very small constant that may produce a subnormal result. And the final unit test fails due to an infinite loop that assumes subnormal numbers are treated as non-zero.
Restrict Skia Tests. Restrict-Skia fails seven unit tests but passes all rendering tests. The failing unit tests match the failures of Full caused by the removal of subnormals. The remaining two unit tests fail due more limited range of Restrict.
Fixing Tests. A six line change to the SkFloatToHalf function (using an alternate, equivalent computation) removes one failure leaving only four failures for Full and six failures for Restrict. Furthermore, a four line change eliminates the infinite loop found in the last failure, safely discarding inputs that underflow to zero. While this change removes the infinite loop and allows the test to complete, it still reports an error because CTFP cannot handle subnormal numbers. However, the fact that Skia passes all the rendering tests demonstrates that CTFP's semantic changes provide enough to power a robust rendering library.
CTFP Has Acceptable Overheads
Micro-benchmark on Normals. We measure the overhead of CTFP calls compared to traditional floating-point operations on normal operands. We run each operation with two normal operands, and measure the time that each takes using the method from Section 5.1. 8 The first two columns of Figure 9 illustrate CTFP's overhead for each operation. Restrict CTFP is approximately twice as fast as the Full version for all operations except square root. This is because the implementation of square root is identical between the two versions as range restriction is unnecessary. Division is much slower than the other operations because it requires far more special cases.
In general, we find that the vectorized versions of each operation (except square root on doubles) outperforms the scalar version by up to 15% despite performing additional computation. This speedup is due to poor code generation by the compiler backend-values are often passed back and forth between SIMD registers and integer registers instead of computing exclusively on SIMD registers. To take advantage of this, all scalar operations call the vectorized version by leaving the remainder of the register uninitialized. Although it may seem unsafe to operate on uninitialized values, CTFP will safely protect every value. Micro-benchmark on Subnormals. We also compare CTFP's performance to baseline floating-point operations on subnormal inputs. 9 This comparison asks how the overhead of subnormals in traditional floating-point operations compares to the overhead of eliminating them these operations in CTFP. As Figure 9 shows, for addition, multiplication, and square root, the overhead of computing with subnormals is far worse than eliminating them. However, the overhead introduced for division is roughly 50% slower than operating on subnormals. Even so, the division operation protects against values beyond subnormals (e.g., zero and NaN).
Macro-benchmark. We compare CTFP's performance to baseline performance on the SPECfp benchmarks. The performance penalty on Spec sometimes exceeds that on micro-benchmarks because CTFP's decorations hinder optimizations and efficient machine code generation. Even so, the Restrict decorations add an overhead of between 1.7x-8.1x on floating-point intensive code, and the Full decorations add an overhead of 3x to 29x.
We also compare the performance overhead of CTFP using all 654 of Skia's CPU rendering tests from the nanobench tool. Figure 10 presents the performance of CTFP using a CDF that shows the overhead (normalized to base runtime) against the number of tests that fall below that performance threshold. Most tests (> 90%) incurred less than 3.7x slowdown with Restrict and less than 10x slowdown with Full. 9 CTFP's performance on subnormals is unchanged, since CTFP is constant-time.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our CTFP approach has several limitations. Some of these are inherent to our approach, while others can be addressed in future work.
Control Flow Related Timing Channels. CTFP only applies to handling individual FP operations that have exploitable timing variability across different operands; it does not consider the orthogonal problem of information leakage via control flow and memory access. A complete protection mechanism would have to combine solutions for both kinds of timing channels, potentially leveraging some of the techniques from [33, 34] .
Scaling Verification. While the SMT solver proved to be invaluable in unearthing tricky corner cases, we were unable to use it to verify the two most complex transformations without resorting to assumptions: multiplication and division (Section 4). Additionally, it would be desirable to verify all the 64-bit versions of the transformations. SMT solvers have only recently started supporting floating-point decision procedures, which ultimately use "bitblasting" to reduce all queries down to propositional SAT formulas. We are optimistic that with more work, the solvers will be able to scale up to handle more complex transformations.
Subnormal-Sensitive Applications. While we have demonstrated that CTFP preserves the functionality of real-world applications like SPEC and Skia, there are many, many more applications-some of which may require exact IEEE-754 semantics. In future work, it would be interesting to support these applications with a new version of CTFP that transforms code so that all FP operations safely operate over subnormals (like the Escort system [34] ).
Full Truncation of FLT_MIN/DBL_MIN to Zero. Due to double rounding in Full, multiplication and division may truncate an output of FLT_MIN/DBL_MIN-the smallest normal floating-point number-to zero. Newer CPUs support the FMA (fused multiplyadd) instruction that could eliminate the undesired double rounding and restore correct calculation of all, non-subnormal operations.
Optimizing CTFP Output. The current code generated by CTFP contains a number of optimization opportunities. For example, when Full is applied the expression a +1, both the operands a and 1 are replaced by zero if they are subnormal-however, the constant value 1 will never be subnormal and therefore the check may be removed. Further work may safely optimize CTFP code while still protecting against timing channels.
RELATED WORK
Next, we survey recent related work on timing channels and their prevention, particularly focusing on systems related to floatingpoint computations.
Timing Channels. Kocher's seminal paper [24] was one of the first to consider the security implications of covert timing channels, in particular timing channels that arise due to data-dependencies. Since then, many attacks against real world systems have leveraged such timing attacks [4, 17, 19, 25, 26, 30, 32, 38] .
FP Timing Channels and Defenses. Andrysco et al. were the first to demonstrate the dangers of data-dependency of floatingpoint operations by carrying out timing attacks against Firefox and Fuzz [4] . To address these timing attacks, they presented a fixedpoint library, libfixedtimefixedpoint(FTFP), implemented in software. FTFP has significant performance overhead, but was mechanically verified to be constant time [3] In the context of crypto systems, Coppens et al. [15] and Cleemput et al. [13] introduced the idea of using program transformations to pad variable-latency instructions, or to run them in parallel with other instructions to force variable-latency instructions to run in constant-time. The Escort system of Rane et al. [34] builds upon this padding scheme to address the FP attacks of [4] . Escort executes potentially deadly FP operations (which may involve subnormals) in a parallel SIMD pipeline with a dummy subnormal operation. Assuming the SIMD instruction retires only when both operations are complete, Escort ensures that all FP operations are effectively slowed down to operate at the (fixed) speed of subnormal computations.
Kohlbrenner and Shacham [25] demonstrated the danger of Escort's hardware-based padding by finding new special values that affect the latency of instructions, thereby circumventing the Escort system. Intel's flush-to-zero (FTZ) and denormals-are-zero (DAZ) CPU flags can be turned on to disable computations on subnormals; Chrome, for example, relies on these flags when calling into the Skia graphics library to address timing attacks [11] . Unfortunately, these CPU flags need to be very carefully enabled and disabled on a per library (function) basis. Kohlbrenner and Shacham [25] demonstrate that managing the flags can be error-prone, leaving the system vulnerable to attacks. Moreover, like the Escort's hardwarebased method, FTZ and DAZ cannot prevent attacks that use other (non-subnormal) special values. Nevertheless, as a defense-in-depth, CTFP can be easily be modified to enable these CPU flags during our program transformation pass.
Other Covert Digital Channels. To prevent attacks that leverage timing channels, it is insufficient to solely ensure that instructions are constant-time. Timing-attack vulnerabilities can arise from program control flow, memory access patterns, and so on. Previous solutions address these attacks via program transformations [2, 8, 15, 28, 33, 34] , clever usage of hardware, e.g., Intel's hardware transactional memory [20, 35] , performance counters [14, 37] , or partitioned caches [31, 32] ) even black-box, whole system mitigation techniques [5] . While many of these techniques are orthogonal-Askarov et al. 's technique being the one exception that can be used to tackle timing attacks more generally-we believe that CTFP would be especially well-suited to be used alongside the control flow and memory transformations of Racoon [33] and Escort [34] . Both Racoon and Escort tackle leaks via control flow and memory access patterns, but rely on constant-time elementary floating-point operations.
SMT Verification of FP Optimizations. Alive-FP [27] and LifeJacket [29] both verify floating-point optimizations at the LLVM IR level using an SMT solver. Both focus on proving total semantic preservation. We, in contrast, translate our LLVM Restrict and Full operations to SMT formulas in order to verify safety: that no deadly values appear as the inputs or outputs of FP operations, and (partial) equivalence: that semantics are preserved only for non-dangerous or non-deadly values respectively. Escort [34] uses an SMT solver to determine which of a program's FP operations are guaranteed to operate on non-subnormal values. These operations may be safely left unmodified. While they only consider subnormals, it would be natural to extend their tool to additionally consider other unsafe special values. Thus, we envision an extension to CTFP that uses symbolic execution to automatically eliminate the decorators when it is safe to do so.
CONCLUSION
Many systems rely on floating-point operations to run in constant time for security. Unfortunately, hardware floating point units exhibit timing variability for various input classes (e.g., subnormals, zeros, infinities, and NaNs) and solutions that repurpose various hardware features (e.g., CPU flags such as FTZ and DAZ) have not held up. We present CTFP, a software-based approach that addresses floating-point timing channels in an extensible and mechanically verified fashion. CTFP translates floating-point computations to use our constant-time operations (e.g., fadd and fmul), which either eliminate unsafe classes of values or emulate computation on such values in software, in constant time. CTFP breaks IEEE-754 semantics to ensure reasonable performance. But, importantly, CTFP does not break the semantics of real-world applications.
